The effects of computer science on human society can be usefully viewed within the framework of scale change. A number of examples of scale change are considered: in design, mathematics, social organization, medicine, and most especially, in the modeling and perception of the complex biological and social world in which we live. The common feature in these examples is the computer's ability to allow humans to return to modes of thought that are crucial to both the psychological and historical origins of scientific and engineering activities, but that were deemphasized in the classical scientific paradigm because of limitations on information processing. The explicit appreciation of the scale-changing power of the computer has important implications for computer science education and for its role in fully releasing the creative possibilities in the human-computer relationship.
INTRODUCTION
How can computer science education be organized so that human beings can most creatively use the power the computer makes available to them? This question is continually being addressed by educators and administrators in universities and other institutions responsible for supporting and benefiting from computer science activities.
Such a complex question could hardly be expected to have a simple answer. The immense computational power of modern computers has a social power that bears on this issue in a way that is insufficiently appreciated; the power to create changes in scale in areas as diverse as scientific investigation, artistic expression, and social interaction. By scale change, we mean sufficient change in the relative amount of effort expended on the different components of an activity to fundamentally alter its character or its relation to other human activities. While it is not difficult to recognize that changes in scale created by the computer produce dramatic transformations in many features of human society, it is difficult to appreciate the changes that must occur in human beings in order for them to adapt to and benefit from the new world of possibilities offered them by computers.
These scale changes are forcing paradigm changes on human beings. By paradigm change, we mean a change in a scheme or framework used as a reference point for evaluating experience. The framework may be determined by a set of examples shared by the community. This definition is one of several used by the historian Kuhn in his studies of scientific revolutions such as the Copernican revolution or the change from the Newtonian conception of space and time to the relativistic one. 1 There has always been a natural human tendency to resist changes of a fundamental nature, whether they involve the developments considered by historians of science or the development currently being instituted by the computer. Since this resistance may lead to the neglect of those uses of the computer that have the greatest potential value to human beings, it is necessary to carefully examine the nature of the paradigm changes that are occurring, taking appropriate steps to ensure that our educational practices facilitate rather than resist them.
The phrase "paradigm change" is in one respect misleading. The computer creates an indefinitely large and varied number of new ways of perceiving both the world and ourselves. While instituting many new paradigms, it is destroying the traditional methodological paradigms with which scholars, scientists, engineers, and artists have worked for hundreds of years, but which inhibit the creative use of the computer.
The best way to examine the phenomenon of scale change is through examples. We consider several: in design, mathematics, social organization, medicine, and most especially, in the modeling and perception of the complex world in which we live. We shall argue that scale changes created by the computer enable man to return to modes of thinking that in both a psychological and historical sense are "primitive," but which have been discarded, in some cases thousands of years ago, because of scale changes in human activities that could not at the time be matched by scale changes in information processing.
FOUR EXAMPLES OF SCALE CHANGE

The Process of Design
For several hundred years, man has relied on lines when designing structures and devices he wished to build. Architects make line drawings of the buildings they wish to build, machine designers make two-dimensional blueprints, as do carpenters, gardeners, and city planners. If one desires to work with three-dimensional models and the problem involves the design of a small building or an uncomplicated device, it is possible to model it with clay, experimenting with different versions of it in three dimensions. If, however, the design involves a complicated machine, such as an automobile engine, or a large building, like a hospital, it is basically impossible to experiment in three dimensions. Although possible to build a model, it is necessary to design it with lines, using illusory devices such as perspective to explore its threedimensional structure. In order to experiment with it, one has to expend too much effort demolishing and rebuilding it.
With the advent of computers, it has become possible to return to a more primitive and intuitive mode of thinking. Using the computer, it is possible to model solid objects with combinations of a few primitive solids (such as cubes, spheres, cylinders, and cones), then to experiment with different configurations and proportions of the models.
2 Such real-space design techniques are now used in architecture and in the design of machinery.
Thousands of years ago, advances in technology separated man from a direct use of space in design, inaugurating an age of designing with abstraction. Today, a further advance of technology enables man to separate himself from the use of abstraction for design, reinaugurating an age of design through experiment with perceived three-dimensional models.
The Practice of Mathematics
For a thousand years, the major mathematical activities of human beings have been routine. Although history recounts the work of great creative mathematicians such as Archimedes, Newton, Gauss, and Alkhwarizmi (for whom the word algorithm is named), most of the effort expended on mathematical activities has involved routine computations. Even Gauss expended years of labor calculating the motions of the planets. The possibilities for experimenting with mathematical structures have been limited to those that could be done by hand.
The most obvious capability of the computer is its ability to perform routine computations, leaving the mathematical practitioner free to concentrate on understanding the mathematical process rather than the execution of its technique. More important, by sharpening the border between the creative and routine components of mathematics, the computer is redefining what can be considered bona fide mathematical work. What was previously considered work for mathematicians^-for example, difficult integrations or simplifications of complex algebraic expressions-is now work for computer programs. Writing the programs is creative; executing them is routine.
The paradigm change in mathematics is, however, much greater. The great mathematician Poincare thought that induction was the basis of mathematics, and one can reasonably assume that he meant experimentation with cases. The earliest mathematicians discovered the basic features of geometry and arithmetic through experimentation. Problems then became too difficult for experiment. With Euclid began the axiomatic method that eventually became the guiding paradigm.
As in the case of design, the computer plays the role of the great scale changer. The possibility of experimenting on mathematical structures with computers has opened problems for investigation previously uncontemplated from an axiomatic point of view, thereby fundamentally altering the balance of power between investigation through experiment and investigation through formal analysis and proof. Yet the computer program used for such experimental exploration of the abstract world is the ultimate of formal prescription and constructive proof.
It is worth illustrating this point with another historical example. Leibniz, coinventor of the calculus, was perhaps the earliest writer to conceive of a symbolic language that could be used as a deductive calculus. 3 At the same time, he distinguished the process of generating the elements of a set from the process of determining whether an element is a member of that set. In modern parlance, this distinction corresponds to the distinction between recursive enumerability and recursiveness. Leibniz had the quaint idea that it would take about five years to solve all problems by deductive means using his logical symbolism. Although he had recognized the importance of questions that could only be answered through a generative process, he understandably failed to recognize that the power of computing as a means of exploring mathematical structures is greater than its power to prove theorems about these structures.
We now know that even problems that are unsolvable in principle may be answered with a degree of confidence, depending on the amount of computation invested in them. 4 It is clear that the idea of proof confidence radically alters the concept of mathematical truth, eroding the traditionally sharp distinction between deductive and inductive methodologies. These concepts and distinctions are even more radically altered when the enumerative power of the computer as a means of mathematical experimentation is recognized. This previous lack of computational power had forced Leibniz and other mathematicians to discard the experimental conception of mathematics in favor of a completely axiomatic and deductive one. The scale-changing power of the computer again returns us to a historically more primitive conception that was dominant in the time of Babylon and old Egypt and that is radically different from our present ideas. Leibniz's process of enumeration has been so amplified by the computer that it has fundamentally undermined the deductive paradigm it was originally conceived of as supporting.
The Size of Society
Human beings originally lived in small societies in which all members of a group had personal awareness of one another. As time passed and the population increased, the potential decreased for knowing all members of one's social group or even for knowing all individuals with whom one had important interactions. For some writers and social scientists, the alienation of individuals from those on whom they depend and from those who depend on them is the most pronounced feature of human society.
The usual view is that the computer increases human alienation. Although computers can increase the specialization of society, invade the privacy of the individual at will, and erect barriers between individual and institution, they need not. Properly understood, the computer can be used to decrease the effective size of society by increasing the number and value of interpersonal contacts. If properly used, it can allow individuals a greater awareness of each other's needs and a greater access to available resources. For example, an instructor in a large, diverse institution can recognize and respond to the needs of his individual students. As a researcher, he can use the computer to identify other individuals with relevant interests or skills. Computers can make large libraries essentially smaller with the use of more effective searching techniques. Computers can provide selective and effective channels of communication among individuals with common interests. In short, properly used the computer can change the scale of social interaction, recapturing some of the personal features valued in simpler societies, while avoiding the constraints and parochialisms that undoubtedly gave many the impetus, or at least the desire, to escape from these societies.
The Practice of Medicine
Prior to this century, there were no life support systems to maintain catastrophically injured and critically impaired individuals. With the development of industrial society, the number of catastrophic injuries from which an individual could survive, albeit in an impaired state, has increased. In effect, the first consequence of scientific medicine and technology has been an increase in the number of handicapped individuals in society.
With the development of intelligent microprocessor-based prosthetic devices, it is now possible and even economical for a paralyzed individual to use myoelectric signals to control effector devices or voice synthesizers to manipulate objects or create artificial speech. 5 The scale-changing power of the computer is reversing the by-products of scientific medicine and technology, returning us to a more primitive situation in which all members of society were capable of full participation.
There was previously a sharp distinction between man and the machine he created. As machines became more intelligent, this distinction became less clear. Perhaps this scale change allows a return to a time when man viewed himself as a part of nature and adapted to it.
MODELING THE EXTERNAL WORLD AND EXPERIMENTING WITH INTUITIONS
Very early in human history, thinking about the world in which we live was informal. Formal tools such as classical mathematics had not been developed. Only natural, human languages such as Greek, Hebrew, or Persian were available. Scholars and scientists used these powerful but informal languages as tools to describe the natural universe and social world and to explore the mental images they had created.
As time passed, scholars created certain specialized instruments of analysis, such as geometry, algebra, and calculus. Not everything that can be described or contemplated with natural language can be contemplated conveniently with these formal tools. What can be described may be explored by precise means that go well beyond our intuitive, informal capability. As a consequence, premathematical thinking about the world with the powerful tool of natural language gave rise to mathematical thinking about models of the world that could be formulated in tractable mathematical frameworks. Although intuition did not cease being the source of these models, scientists attempted to the greatest possible extent to couple intuition and abstraction. The ability of the human being to perform many types of computations is so weak that an enormous amount of abstraction is necessary if one is to arrive at a humanly computable model.
Not all sciences went in this direction. In some cases, notably the historical disciplines, the required degree of abstraction simplified the reality too much to be useful. In those cases, the advantages of the ability to compute were outweighed by the losses inherent in the initial abstractions. As a consequence, science has split into two parts. One part has practitioners who recognize only those phenomena that can be formulated in mathematical frameworks. The second part deals with different phenomena, and still is formulated in natural language. There are of course disciplines that use both descriptions. One example is economics, a part of which is mathematical and rigorously deductive, but unable to describe economic phenomena adequately. The very description of these refractory phenomena requires informal modes of thinking that rely on ordinary language.
The computer can again create a profound change of scale, altering the balance of power between intuitive and formal thought and introducing a potentially greater unity into the bifurcated structure of science. By enormously amplifying man's power to compute, the computer has reduced the degree to which he must abstract the world around him in order to compute. Our symbiosis with the computer has so enhanced our formal capabilities that we are now free to use our natural powers of problem formulation more fully. The mathematically oriented sciences can enlarge the sphere of problems they treat and the sphere of phenomena they are willing to contemplate. They can experiment with ideas previously rejected on the grounds of incompatibility with formal analysis. The nonmathematical, natural-language-based sciences can use the medium of formal computer languages to express and compute with models previously outside the range of formal investigation.
In fact, computers are not being used as creatively as they could be for this purpose. Although all natural and social sciences now use computers, in nearly all cases it is as a prosthetic to traditional precomputer methodology. Many examples could be given. One is from ecosystem biology: Over fifty years ago, the mathematician Volterra formulated a simple differential equations model to describe the interaction of predator and prey in an ecosystem. 6 Today the computer is used by many investigators to find numerical solutions to these equations. The studies use the computer as a prosthetic to a traditional model formulated to be analyzable, at least to some extent, without the computer. Although a legitimate use of the computer, it is not a powerful one. We can formulate our understanding of the complex interactions in an ecosystem more completely and accurately by direct use of the formal instrument of a computer language. That is, instead of mapping the reality into the formalisms of traditional mathematics, then using the computer to compute this map, we can map the reality directly, using the language instruments of computer science. 7 Contemplate for a moment the immense complexity of the genetic and physiological processes within organisms, the spatial and temporal dynamics of the environment, the interactions among organisms and between each organism and the environment, and the flow of mass between organisms and environment. Contemplate the statistical process of variation, the problem-solving behavior of organisms and the selective action of the environment. The investigator who refuses to admit the validity of computer languages as primary instruments of analysis foregoes any possibility of giving a holistic but formal description of such a system, or, more precisely, of formally expressing a holistic theory of it. Accepting such instruments of language, we can use them to give formal expression to theories about reality that previously could be formulated only by using the instrument of natural language. We can use the computer to calculate these rigorously formulated theories as easily and automatically as we use natural language to describe them. The problem reduces to one of translating from the.natural language description to the computer language description.
The difference between these computer models and precomputer mathematical models is not that one is mathematical and the other is not. The difference is that the computer has redefined the term "tractable." Traditionally, a tractable model is an analytically solvable one. Significant simplifying assumptions are necessary about the complex interactions in the real world in order to make models that are analytically manageable. For dynamic models, the indispensable assumption is that they are analytic, that is, that their local behavior can be used to derive all relevant information about their global behavior. One cannot reasonably call a model mathematical unless it is solvable-otherwise it is just symbology. The crucial point is that our scientific thinking need no longer be guided by the precomputer criteria of tractability. What was previously symbology is now bona fide mathematics. As in the examples of design, mathematics as such, and social organization, the computer has introduced a change in scale that returns us to modes of thought that played important roles in the early stages of human history, but that were quenched by the advance of technology; in this case, by the advance of the analytical technology of classical mathematics.
In modeling the world, we argue that the most valuable role of the computer is as a prosthetic to the human thought process itself, not as a prosthetic to precomputer methodologies. Yet most natural and social science modeling is guided by precomputer criteria. Some of it, especially in the biological and social sciences, is completely conceptual and informal. The reason, we believe, is that there are two ways of judging models and theories. One is aesthetic, the other is practical.
For the computer scientist, computer models may be aesthetically pleasing even if they have no utility. Exploring such models experimentally, using methods usually associated with experimental science, seems like a legitimate activity. For the precomputer scientist, models formulated directly in terms of computer languages and the experimental models used to study them may seem aesthetically unpleasing and dubious even if they have enormous utility. The question involves the criteria to which we have become habituated over hundreds of years. The criteria that had to be fulfilled by a model to make it useful in the precomputer stage of science have, after hundreds of years, become transformed into aesthetic criteria. These have been useful in guiding scientists in the direction of utilitarian models and theories. Now new classes of models are possible that are unaesthetic according to traditional perception, but clearly are useful. With these models, we can investigate the consistency and implications of informal theories that guide our intuitions about ecological systems, business firms, whole economies, and the thought process itself. It is the change in aesthetic criteria that is the painful but fruitful methodological paradigm shift that the computer is introducing into natural and social science.
Man's new power to formulate algorithmic models in the languages of the computer and to use the computer to explore these models has an interesting epistemological implication. Our knowledge and procedure bases are limited by biological evolution. There is a tendency, in some cases even an urge, to perceive and analyze the world in terms of one, two, or three categories. Thus, there are monistic philosophies-which view all observable phenomena as a manifestation of a single underlying reality; dualistic philosophies-such as Zoroastrianism-which attempt to perceive the world in terms of two competing forces; and triadic philosophies, such as Hegel's dialectic. The computer is not inherently subject to these limitations. We can program it to perceive and analyze in terms of many more categories than any human being could. It is possible that with the computer we will reach a point of communicating useful models without understanding how these models work. It is conceivable that man's biologically and historically developed tastes are completely arbitrary as far as his understanding of the world is concerned. Alternatively, it is conceivable that there is a fortuitous and marvelous match between the structure of reality and the structure of his thought processes. More likely, there is a good match for some aspects of reality, a poor one for others. One new possibility created by the computer is that of obtaining a deeper appreciation of the relationship between the human mind and the external world; a problem of immense philosophical interest that until now could never have been the object of serious experimentation.
EDUCATION OF THE COMPUTER SCIENTIST
How do the possibilities created by the computer bear on the education of the computer scientist and, equally important, on the computer-education of the public at large? The chief problem with the computer remains communication with it. At first, communication involved the arduous formulation of algorithms in primitive codes that could be used to control the state of the machine. As time passed, higher-level languages were developed in which the ideas of the programmer could be expressed more easily. The problems of compiling these languages into machine code become prominent. As more people began to use the computer, the problem of program management-essentially of operating systems-became prominent. As programs became more complex and computation less costly, the problem of writing readable, modifiable programs and of establishing the correctness of programs assumed greater importance. A great deal of emphasis in computer science education is rightfully placed on these and related issues; that is, on the issues involving the structure and use of formal languages to abstract reality for the machine.
The view we have suggested of the computer as a scale changer points to another issue that should enter computer science education more conspicuously than it does. The development of the computer has shifted the balance of effort involved in the formulation and solution of problems. The computer is a formal instrument, and our symbiosis with it has extended the formal side of our linguistic capabilities. We argue that by so doing it should free our intuitive, creative capabilities, not only because it reduces routine work, but also because it opens new possibilities for the creative formalization and exploration of intuition. For classical scientists, the problem of calculating a solution was enormously time consuming, so formulation had to be very careful. Only the very best scientists could successfully concern themselves with problem formulation. With the advent of modern computer systems, the problem of solving formulated problems has be-come much easier. Once a problem is posed in a computer language, the computer automatically solves it, and the problem of modeling is reduced to one of problem formulation. The computer as a scale changer has effected a major shift in the faculties of thought that a scientist can most fruitfully cultivate. As computer languages and computer systems have developed to become more powerful and usable, they have shifted the return on the investment of scientific effort from the problem-solving faculty to the faculty of problem formulation.
There is an interesting analogy to the structure of the brain itself. It is now believed that the right and left hemispheres of the brain specialize for different functions, just as left and right hands do. Evidence indicates that one hemisphere is specialized for linguistic and analytical tasks; the other for intuitive, geometric, and Gestalt thinking. These specializations are not sharp, just as the different tasks performed by the left and right hands are not sharply delineated into two classes of functions. It appears that the brain of a single individual is a symbiosis of two kinds of computing. The development of traditional mathematical techniques placed constraints on the intuitive modes of thinking that were the source of this technology. The development of computers provided such an enormous amplification of power of the linguisticanalytical side of the brain that it has created previously unknown opportunities for the intuitive-creative side.
One problem in computer education is to train the linguistic side in the proper use of formal computer languages, a difficult task even for individuals gifted in analytical capabilities. The mastery of formal skills is necessary for communication with the computer even though it seems counterproductive to concentrate solely on their cultivation when the computer is so much more effective than any human in executing formal processes. Once mastered, the formal skills should be used creatively; that is, the student's intuitive, ideational capabilities to communicate useful things to the computer should be cultivated. Arriving at an algorithm or proof idea and formulating it in a computer program involve different, though interacting modes of thought. In our teaching of computer science, we have emphasized the linguistic side. Now, as we step into the age of the new possibilities opened by the computer, it is time to emphasize the use of the formal tools to express ideas and formulate problems.
This educational goal should be consciously incorporated into our computer science curricula at the earliest levels. It is, of course, already implicitly present. For example, the field of artificial intelligence has as its main problem the communication of a world-conception to the computer. Nevertheless, in all but the most advanced areas of our computer science education, we place so much emphasis on the formal, linguistic side that the intuitive capabilities that guide program construction atrophy in many students before they reach the point where they can recultivate them. This situation can be altered. The two modes of thinking required to work effectively with the computer can be cultivated simultaneously, just as learning an artistic technique can be pursued simultaneously with the cultivation of artistic ideation by the student of creative arts. In this respect, the computer is a new medium, and computer science has an aspect of the creative arts that should be explicitly recognized at the beginning of our educational practice.
Viewed as a device forcing the programmer into inhumanly formal modes of thinking, the computer is alien, and provokes hostility in those forced to deal with it. Viewed as a new medium of expression and as a way of harnessing our most personal human potential, it should evoke pleasure in those dealing with it. Viewed merely as a prosthetic to classical scientific methodology, the use of the computer will always be seen as an admission of failure to be sufficiently clever to preclude its need. Viewed as a prosthetic to the human thought process itself, the computer can be viewed as one of the most effective means of thought. Accepted as a paradigm changer, the computer can serve to reveal new views of the world as meaningful for the evolution of human thought as those that arose during any period of scientific revolution.
